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Samir Okasha’s Agents and Goals in Evolution considers agential thinking in biology. The book 
is exceptionally well written.  It is thorough, precise, and draws appropriately restrained claims 
about when and whether agential thinking can be useful.  As Okasha points out, such thinking is 
commonplace, and falls roughly into two camps.  First, biologists often conceptualize organisms 
as agents who seek to accomplish certain goals, and especially as rational agents who seek to 
promote their own fitness (agential thinking 1). Second, biologists sometimes conceptualize the 
process of evolution itself as driven by an agent with goals (agential thinking 2).  While Okasha 
largely rejects agential thinking (2), he argues that agential thinking (1) can play a legitimate role 
in theorizing.  This review will describe the progress of the book, and conclude by discussing a 
topic that attenuates the appropriateness of rational agent thinking in biology. 
 Okasha begins part I by arguing that treating biological entities as agents is most useful 
when these entities display a unity of purpose, derived from shared biological fate.  In such 
cases, the entity will typically engage in behaviors that appear instrumentally rational, and 
coherently lead towards certain goals.  Agential thinking can elucidate how these evolved traits 
and behaviors fit together to fulfill these goals.  In addition, as Okasha points out, agents with the 
proper unity of purpose can often be represented, using decision theory, as rational agents whose 
goal is to promote their own fitness.  
A natural question arises: are entities other than organisms – namely genes and groups –
usefully thought of as agent-like?  Okasha argues that this is most appropriate in understanding 
traits that otherwise seem to make no sense, like “outlaw genes” that promote their own fitness at 
the expense of organismic fitness.  In these cases, the gene does not share the organism’s unity of 
purpose, and so is usefully treated as a separate agent working towards its own goals.  What 
about groups?  As Okasha points out, true unity of purpose is relatively rare in biological groups, 
but not unheard of.  In such cases groups can be treated as agents. 
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In part II of the book, Okasha moves on to ask: does evolution maximize population 
fitness?  And: does it optimize the fitness of individual agents?  As Okasha points out, there are 
conceptual connections here to agential thinking of both types – if evolution maximizes 
population fitness, it is arguably acting like a rational agent (agential thinking 2).  If organisms 
evolve to be optimal, then we expect them to be rational as well (agential thinking 1).   
This is the most technical part of the book.  Okasha goes through several extant 
arguments for maximization/optimization.  With regards to Wright’s adaptive landscapes (see 
Wright (1932))   – while evolution will supposedly climb hills in these landscapes, this sort of 
hill climbing actually only occurs under restricted conditions.  This case of agential reasoning 2 
is thus a misleading one.  Okasha also addresses Alen Grafen’s maximizing agent analogy 
(Grafen, 2014) which suggests that individual fitness maximization is the expected result of 
natural selection.  However, Grafen focuses on frequency independent selection, i.e., where 
fitness of a genotype does not depend on the prevalence of that genotype in the population.  
Under frequency dependent selection both average population fitness and individual adaptedness 
can decrease as evolution progresses.  
Okasha then turns to maximization/optimization arguments in social evolution.  The 
evolution of altruism looks like a serious problem for optimization (and for conceptualizing of 
organisms as rational); because altruists (irrationally) decrease their fitness to benefit group 
members.  However, the metaphor can be saved by appeal to inclusive fitness, which tracks the 
offspring an individual causes (rather than direct descendants).  Under certain conditions, 
evolved altruists will behave like rational agents who maximize inclusive fitness.  Under other 
conditions, though, things are more subtle, meaning that the rational agent metaphor cannot 
always be saved.   
Okasha, however, does not take the failures of these theoretical arguments for 
optimization to negate the usefulness of agential thinking.   As Okasha points out, empirically we 
do tend to see adaptation in biology.  This, then, is the proper justification for adaptationist 
approaches and agential thinking.  An upshot is that we should be critical of agential thinking (2) 
– mother nature does not seem to “choose rationally” – but agential thinking (1) is still 
reasonable in cases where we can see empirically that organisms are well-adapted and act to 
maximize their own fitness. 
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Part III of the book addresses the connection between evolution and rationality. Okasha 
differentiates two important issues here.  First, related to part I, rationality concepts are useful for 
thinking about organisms’ behavior.  Second, actual rationality is an evolved trait.  As he points 
out, these are linked by the idea that the behavioral plasticity of many organisms is proto-
rational.  This fact helps elucidate both how we evolved rational thinking, and also why we can 
usefully treat such animals as rational agents.  In other words, this conceptual link both helps 
justify agential thinking 1, and explains why this thinking is so often useful. 
Okasha starts this part with the question of how and whether rationality evolved.  
Flexible behavior and psychological states of belief and desire, i.e., proto-rationality, arguably 
evolved to help organisms deal with variable and complex environments.  The next question is 
whether evolution drives organisms towards more full-bodied rationality. Clearly creatures that 
have accurate beliefs and consistent desires related to maximizing biological fitness will often 
tend to do well in the world.  But this observation does not mean that evolution will always 
select for full rationality. 
Okasha goes through a number of arguments showing how evolved behavior can depart 
from economic-style rationality, i.e. from utility maximization.  First, in evolutionary game 
theoretic models of the prisoner’s dilemma and the ultimatum game, behavior that does not look 
rational can evolve, i.e., altruism and retaliation.  But we need not think of this behavior as 
irrational if organisms have evolved to value things other than fitness, such as the well-being of 
others, and fairness.  However, if we make this move we need to be careful about treating 
organisms as rational fitness maximizers, which theorists often do.  Further cases regard the 
evolution of intransitive choices, irrational risk preferences, and irrational payoff discounting.  In 
each case, irrational looking behaviors 1) can evolve in models and 2) are empirically observed.  
In each case, though, Okasha again points out that if we re-contextualize the choice scenario, the 
behavior will instead seem rational.  So again, this means that while conceptualizing organisms 
as rational fitness maximizers must be done carefully, this conceptualization can still be useful.   
Despite his persistent caution, Okasha does not do much to address a ubiquitous set of 
cases that might be added to this part of the book: ones where constraints related to cognition and 
evolution necessarily prevent rational behavior.  For instance, it might be extremely costly to 
develop the cognitive apparatus to engage in high rationality behavior.  And doing so might 
require an organism to give up on other desirable cognitive features.  It seems to me that many of 
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these constraints suggest important further limitations on the use of agential concepts in biology.  
Furthermore, ignoring these constraints has led biologists wrong in real cases.   
To give one example from my work, Maynard-Smith (1982) argues that evolution will 
select for learning that leads to the play of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSes) in strategic 
contexts.  ESSes make up a subset of predicted rational behavior in the relevant scenarios.  His 
argument is essentially that because ESSes are equilibria in games, other behaviors do poorly 
against them, and will be selected against.   However, learning strategies that quickly adopt 
decently good behavior often do not allow organisms to learn ESSes.  Consider learning 
generalization, whereby organisms apply learned lessons to novel, but perceptually similar, 
scenarios.  This kind of learning is necessary for successful behavior (since organisms very 
rarely find themselves in the exact same scenarios twice).  It also leads to actions that are not 
perfectly tuned for the exact scenario they are employed in, and thus are not ESSes.  But we can 
use evolutionary models to show that because the speed of learning matters so much to organism 
payoffs, imprecise, quick, generalizing strategies do, in fact, evolve (O’Connor, 2017).  In other 
words, ignoring cognitive trade-offs led Maynard-Smith to incorrectly predict the emergence of 
rational behavior. 
I do not think this sort of case is a serious problem for Okasha.  As described, throughout 
the manuscript he advises caution in using (rational) agent concepts in biology.  Furthermore, as 
noted, he urges theorists to use empirical work, rather than theoretical arguments, in deciding 
when agential thinking is appropriate.  I think there is a more specific take-away he might have 
emphasized that seems right given the limitations he focuses on, and the ones he does not, for 
agential thinking.   While we can often treat organisms as rational agents for descriptive 
purposes, we should not do so when trying to predict behavior.  There are too many reasons why 
evolution may not have led to straightforwardly rational behavior in any novel case, even if in 
many cases we can observe that it did. 
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